Doing Another\u27s Bidding Under a Theory of Defense of Others: Shall We Protect the Unborn with Murder? by Moore, Shelby A. D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 86 | Issue 2 Article 2
1997
Doing Another's Bidding Under a Theory of
Defense of Others: Shall We Protect the Unborn
with Murder?
Shelby A. D. Moore
South Texas College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moore, Shelby A. D. (1997) "Doing Another's Bidding Under a Theory of Defense of Others: Shall We Protect the Unborn with




VOLUME 86 1997-98 NUMBER2
ARTICLES
Doing Another's Bidding
Under a Theory of Defense of Others:
Shall We Protect the Unborn with Murder?*
BY SHELBY A.D. MOORE**
* This Article is not intended to be a manifesto for or against abortion. Rather,
it is intended to make a statement about the value of life. Even if one finds the acts
of another morally reprehensible, it does not give one the authority to act outside
of the confines of the positive law to take another's life.
" Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. LL.M. 1992,
Harvard Law School; J.D. 1984, Umversity of Baltimore; B.A. 1981, Towson State
University.
I am grateful for the critical readings of and suggestions from Professors
Michael Wheeler, Helen Jenkins, Teresa Collett, James Musselman, and Elizabeth
Dennis, my colleagues at South Texas College of Law. I extend a special thanks to
Professor Neil McCabe for Ins guidance throughout this project. I also thank
student assistants Angela Nolan, Wendell Champion, Judith Mitchell, and Markay
Stroud. I am eternally grateful for the assistance of Helene Dameris and Monty




I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 258
II VIOLENT ACTrVITIES OF THE ANTI-ABORTION ACTmSTS . 261
A. Increased Violence to EndAbortion ............... 261
B. The Reason for Change ......................... 267
m. THE LAW OF DEFENSE OF OTHERS .................... 271
A. Common Law Origins ........................... 271
B. Defense of Others Under the Model Penal Code ...... 277
C. Justification for Using Deadly Force in Defense of
Another: Basic Requirements ..................... 281
1. Necessity ................................. 284
2. Proportionality ............................ 285
3. Reasonable Belief .......................... 286
4. UnlawfulAct .............................. 288
IV. APPLICATION OF DEFENSE-OF-OTHERS THEORY TO THOSE
WHO KILL ABORTION PROVIDERS .................... 292
CONCLUSION ..................................... 301
I. INTRODUCTION
ne of the most volatile and bitterly divisive issues to confront
this country is abortion. While there have always been heated
debates about abortion, the debate has given way to increased
violence toward - and even the killing of- those who perform abortions.'
'See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-117, at 5 (1993); William Booth, Jury Urges Death
Sentence in Abortion Clinic Murders; Hill Speaks Starkly of 'Responsibility,'
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al; William Claibome & Hamil R. Harris,
ExplainingPensacola's Violent Reputation; Residents Have Many Theories About
Why Their City Has Become Abortion's Battleground, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1994,
atA4; Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor Wounded Outside Kansas ClinicN.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1993, at A12; Stephen J. Hedges et al., Abortion: Who's Behind the
Violence?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1994, at 50; Dirk Johnson,
Abortions, Bibles andBullets, and the Making of a Militant, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1993, at 1; Ian Katz & Madeleine Bunting, God's Shock Troops, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 8, 1993, at 2; Dianne Klein, The End Does Not Justify the Fanatical Means
of Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at A3; Larry Rohter, Doctor is Slain
DuringProtest OverAbortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, atAl; Rorie Sherman,
Abortion ActivistsAidingFederalProbe, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 15,1994, atA_9; Suspect
in Doctor's Shooting Praised Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at 29
[hereinafter, Suspect in Shooting]; Eric L. Wee, Clinic Slaying Suspect Caught;
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Much of the activism m opposition to abortion emanates from religious
leaders and their followers. While most religious leaders believe abortion
is morally wrong, most also acknowledge that the use of force to prevent
abortion is unacceptable and denounce the killing of abortion providers.2
However, other religious leaders and their followers cross the line
separating sympathy' for and advocacy of the rights of the unborn. These
individuals openly support violence toward and the killing of those who
perform abortions,3 reasoning that it is justifiable homicide.4 A scenario
Shooting at NorfolkAbortion Center Tied to Massachusetts Attacks, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 1995, at Al.2 Cardinal John O'Connor and Pat Robinson state that they deplore the recent
killing of abortion providers. See Faye Wattleton, Anti-Choice Terrorism: From
Blockades to Bombs to Murder, MS., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 90; 2 Killed, 5 Hurt in
Clinic Attacks, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), Dec. 31, 1994, at
Al. Flip Benham, preacher and director of Operation Rescue National, condemns
the attacks on abortion providers. "Vigilantism invariably brings with it
lawlessness. One never has the right to take upon himself [sic] the roles of judge,
jury and executioner." Id. See also David M. Smolin, The Religious Root and
Branch ofAnti-Abortion Lawlessness, 47 BAYLOR L. REV 119, 119-20 (1995)
(noting that John T. Noonan, the most respected pro-life scholar "writing in the
natural law tradition, found the 'root' of Roe [v. Wade] to be the positivist belief
that the sovereign has an absolute right to define who counts as a person with
rights. Noonan and an overwhelming majority of those who share his views,
morally condemn" the killing of abortion doctors); John W Kennedy, Killing
DistortsPro-ljfeMessage; Assassination ofPensacolaDoctorJohnBayardBritton
and James Barrett, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 12, 1994, at 56.
' See Georgia M. Sullivan, Note, Protection of Constitutional Guarantees
Under 42 US. C. Section 1985(3): Operation Rescue's "Summer of Mercy, " 49
WASH. &LEEL. REv. 237,237 (1992); MelindaBeck et al., Propaganda MadeMe
Do It, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1994, at 34; Booth, supra note 1, at Al; Hedges et al.,
supra note 1, at 50; Jim Naughton, The Faces of Two Anti Abortionists; A 'Pretty
Normal'Life Contrasts with Confrontational Stand, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1991, at
D1; Rohter, supra note 1, at A2; Rene Sanchez, From Year ofPromise to Year of
Violence; Abortion Rights Advocates Decry Trend Toward Militant Opposition,
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at A14; Ronald Smothers, Death ofa Doctor- The
Overview -Abortion Doctor andBodyguard Slain in Florida; Protestor sArrested
in Pensacola's Second Clinic Killing, N.Y TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 1, Wattleton,
supra note 2, at 90-91.
4 See Mark Curriden, An Unusual Theory Tested and Rejected, Law Review
Article, Withdrawn by Author, Argues Killing ofAbortionist Justified, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1994, at 26; The Murder of "Baby Killers" Slaying Splits Protesters,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 1, 1994, at A03 [hereinafter The Murder of "Baby Killers"];
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often cited by anti-abortiomsts to justify the killing of abortion providers
is as follows: A gunman walks onto a crowded playground (or into a
classroom), gun m hand, and announces that he will kill all the children on
the playground. Before he is able to accomplish his goal, however, a
bystander intervenes and kills the gunman. Because the gunman's actions
are unlawful and because the intervenor's actions are both lawful and
beneficial to society, the intervenor's actions are justified based on atheory
of defense of others.5 The scenario grabs the emotions of the hearer and
cries out for someone to protect the innocent children. However, it is a
weak bridge in the gap between the anti-abortiomst's killing of an abortion
provider and Ins assertion that Ins act is justified under a theory of defense
of others.
This Article presents a dispassionate response to Paul Hill and other
commentators and scholars who argue that defense of others is a legitimate
defense for those who kill doctors and other health care providers who
perform abortions. In addition, the Article seeks to dismantle and ulti-
mately invalidate the anti-abortiomst's reliance on criminal law principles
to justify the killing of abortion providers. Part H of this Article briefly
discusses the violent activities of anti-abortiomsts, which culminate in the
deaths of doctors and other health care providers who assist in the
performance of abortions. It also advances reasons for the shift from
discussion and debate to violence, including the anti-abortiomst's belief
that the killing is justified both morally and legally under a theory of
defense of another. Part III discusses the defense of others under both
common law and the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), as well as the elements
necessary to assert the defense. This Part concludes that the element
inextricably tied to a third-party defense is that one must respond to an
unlawful act. Virtually every court having the opportunity to decide this
issue as it pertains to abortion has held that response to unjustified illegal
Suspect in Shooting, supra note 1, at 29; Sam Howe Verhovek, At Center of
Abortion Shooting: An Avid Protester and an Uncertain Martyr, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 1994, at26.
5 See William Raspberry, A Case ofAbortion by Gunshot, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 1994, at A21 (Raspberry sets forth a scenario similar to that which appears
above to demonstrate the ambivalence most people feel towards abortion. Many
pro-life activists recognize a difference between abortion and infanticide and many
pro-choice activists are repulsed by late-term abortions. However, m my
conversations with those who support the use of violence against abortion
providers, they use the scenario to demonstrate the appropriateness of asserting
defense of others when defending the unborn.).
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aggression is essential to a successful assertion of defense of others. Part
IV addresses the illegitimacy of the anti-abortiomst's reliance on the
atrocities of Nazi Germany and slavery to justify the use of the third-party
defense, on both moral and legal grounds. Tins Article concludes that even
if abortion were illegal, it could not serve as the basis to use deadly force
to end abortion.
H. VIOLENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-ABORTION ACTMiSTS
A. Increased Violence to EndAbortion
On March 19, 1996, John C. Salv HI was convicted of murder for the
deaths of two receptioists, Shannon Elizabeth Lowney and Leanne
Nichols, that resulted from a methodical attack on two Boston abortion
climcs, winch also resulted m the wounding of five other people.6 "While
many people were stunned by the shootings others seemed to expect
such violence," predicting an increase in similar acts m the future.7 In fact,
an anti-abortion protestor stated, "We're seeing the violence that's been
going on inside [the climes] for the last 22 years. It has been spilling out
into the streets and parking lots. There's been a war waged against the
unborn and now there's a response with equal force."'
Six months before these killings, in July 1994, Dr. John B. Britton and
Ins unarmed escort, James Barrett, were shot to death as they sat in their
truck outside a Florida abortion climc. Barrett's function was to protect Dr.
Britton. Barrett's wife, June, also was wounded in the shooting.9
6 See Wee, supra note 1, at Al. One day after the Boston murders, and moments
after a man pulled out a rifle and fired seven times into a Norfolk abortion climc
foyer, John C. Salvi II was arrested. Salvi was charged with the murders of the two
Boston receptiomsts. Investigators focused on Salvi after recovering a bag
containing a handgun, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, and a receipt that led
police to a gun shop in Massachusetts. Just before is arrest, Salvi discarded a .22
caliber semiautomatic Ruger rifle. See id., see also David Weber, Guilty; Salvi
Convicted in Clinic Slayings, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 19, 1996, at 1.
7Wee, supra note 1, at Al.
8Id.
9 See Claiborne & Hams, supra note 1, at A4. Dr. Britton was one of a rapidly
decreasing number of physicians willing to perform abortions in Pensacola,
Florida, after the execution-style killing of Dr. David Gunn, Dr. Britton's
predecessor at the Pensacola Women's Clime. See Sherman, supra note 1, at A9.
Paul Hill was immediately arrested for the killings of Dr. Britton and James
Barrett At trial, State Assistant Attorney Jim Murray showed how Hill purchased
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
On March 10, 1993, as he got out of his car outside of the same
abortion clime that later claimed the lives of Dr. Britton and Is escort, Dr.
David Gunn was shot to death by a pro-life activist. 10 Dr. Gunn's killing,
the first of its kind in the nation,1' made it clear that the nature of the
the shotguns two days before the murders and arrived at the Pensacola Ladies
Center Climc with thirty rounds of ammunition. See Booth, supra note 1, at Al.
Murray described to the jury how Hill first fired three shots into the pickup truck
carrying Dr. Britton and his two escorts. During the first round, James Barrett was
killed. Hill then took thirty seconds to reload while Dr. Britton lay wounded in the
front passenger seat. Hill discharged four additional shotgun blasts, killing Britton.
See id. Murray explained, "'You're literally watching your own execution take
place before your own eyes.' "Id. (quoting Jim Murray). Murray said the killings
were like a mirror into Hill's soul. The jury convicted Hill of first-degree murder
and unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to death by execution. See id.
10See S.REP NO. 103-117, at3 (1993). "Dr. Gunn's death was atragic end to
years of threats, blockades, and personal attacks he had endured." Id. at 3, 4. See
also Katz & Bunting, supra note 1, at 2; Klein, supra note 1, at A3; Rohter, supra
note 1, at A2. Police officers arrested and later charged Michael Griffin with Dr.
Gunn's murder. See Suspect in Shooting, supra note 1, at 29.
Two days after Dr. Gunn's death, Paul Hill began strongly urging the public to
support Michael Griffin, arguing that the killing was justifiable homicide. See
Verhovek, supra note 4, at 26.
In response to the killing of Dr. Gunn, Rachel Ranee Shannon was quoted as
stating, "Is it really so bad? People cheered when Hitler was killed. And this
abortionst was a mass murderer." See Johnson, supra note 1, at Al. Shannon wrote
to Michael Griffin, prmsmg him for his courageous decision. See Suspect in
Shooting, supra note 1, at 29. Mrs. Shannon wrote, "I know you did the right
thing. It was not murder. You shot a murderer. It was more like anti-murder.
I believe in you and what you did, and really want to help if possible. I wish I could
trade places with you." Id. Shannon also referred to Griffim as both a "brave
soldier" and a "hero." Id.
Shortly after the death of Dr. Gunn, Dr. George R. Tiller was shot in both arms
by Shannon, who was passing out anti-abortion literature as Tiller sat in his car
preparing to leave an abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas. See Faison, supra note 1,
at A12. Shannon escaped by car and was arrested at an Oklahoma airport shortly
after the shooting. She was charged with attempted murder. See Suspect in
Shooting, supra note 1, at A29. It appears that Shannon targeted the Women's
Health Care Services Clinic in Wichita, Kansas because it is one of the few clinics
in the country where women can obtain an abortion in the third trimester. See
Faison, supra note 1, at A12. Shannon was convicted of attempted first-degree
murder. See 11-Year Term in Abortion Clinic Shooting, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994,
at A4.
" See Rohter, supra note 1, at Al.
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abortion issue had moved beyond debate and that the cost of performing
abortions in this country could be death. 2
Undoubtedly, there has been an increase in the killing of doctors who
perform abortions and health care providers who work in abortion
facilities.' 3 Yet these deaths are only part of the story Many other acts of
violence are perpetrated against physicians who provide abortions as part
of their medical practice. Since 1977 there have been more than 200
attempted or completed arsons, bombings, and fire bombings of abortion
clinics.14 Many of the most costly arsons and bombings are still
unresolved.15 The consequences of these attacks for health care providers
have been devastating. For example, in March of 1993, arson completely
destroyed the Blue Mountain Clinic in Missoula, Montana. 6 While one of
the Clinic's purposes was to provide first-trimester abortions, the Clinic
was a non-profit facility that "offered a wide range of health care services
including prenatal care and delivery, childhood immunizations, diagnosis
and treatment of sexually transmitted infection, and contraceptive
services."' 7 According to Willa Craig, Executive Director of the Blue
Mountain Clinic, seventy percent of the Clinic's prenatal patients received
Medicaid and had difficulty obtaining obstetric care." Many patients
traveled long distances to reach the Clinic because no services were
11 See Dana S. Gershon, Note, Stalking Statutes: A New Vehicle to Curb the
New Violence of the Radical Anti-Abortion Movement, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REv 215, 215-16 (1994); 1 Paige Lambden, Note, 24 SETONHALLL. REV 2096,
2096-98 (1994). Police have not resolved the killing of Dr. George Patterson, who
served as a physician at the Pensacola, Florida abortion clime. See Johnson, supra
note 1, at 1.
'
3See Clarence Page, Birmingham Abortion BombingRevives Ugly Memories,
THE CINCINNATI POST, Feb.5, 1998, at 19A (stating that according to the Federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, there have been "47 bombings and 151
arsons at climcs since 1982" and that 13 ofthese instances occurred in 1997, "twice
the number of the previous year"); see also Suspect Is Nam ed in Clinic Blast: FBI
Changes Fugitivefrom Witness Status, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 1998, at 11 (discussing
the Jan. 29, 1998 abortion clinic bombing m Birmingham, Ala., which killed an
off-duty police officer and seriously wounded a nurse).
14 See S. REP NO. 103-117, at 5 (1993).
11 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 50. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms reports that of the ten costliest arsons and bombings, eight remain
unsolved. See id.




available near their homes.19 After the fire, however, the Climc was forced
to reduce the number of patients m its care by sixty percent, preventing it
from meeting the needs of the uninsured, the working poor, and citizens
dependent on Medicaid and Medicare.2"
Those climcs that have avoided acts of physical violence have
experienced an increase in death threats and hate mail.21 Beyond these more
traditional acts of harassment, however, those seeking to end abortion have
adopted a new tactic commonly called "stalking," which is generally
defined as "repeated following or harassing of another person."' '
"Stalking scenarios involve a series of individual acts, such as harassing
phone calls and slashed tires, that build on one another. Too often, the
conduct does not end until serious physical injury, or even death, results." 3
While stalking is a "new" tactic for anti-abortiomsts, it has existed for
some time in connection with domestic violence.24 In order to combat
stalking as it initially developed, many state legislatures passed anti-
stalking laws.' Congress responded to stalking and state legislation aimed
" See id.
20 See id. at 6.
21 See Beck et al., supra note 3, at 34. The National Abortion Federation, which
represents abortion providers, reported that death threats at clinics climbed from
eight in 1992 to 78 in 1993. The incidence of hate mail and harassing phone calls
increased from 469 to 628 during that same time period. See id.
I Dawn A. Morville, Recent Development, Stalking Laws: Are They Solutions
for More Problems?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 921, 921 n.2 (1993).
23 Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note, From Impudence to Crime:Anti-Stallang
Laws, 68 NOTREDAMEL. REV 819, 889 (1993).
2 See Morville, supra note 22, at 925 (stating that "approximately ninety
percent of women killed by their husbands or boyfriends were stalked prior to their
deaths"); McAnaney et al., supra note 23, at 823-24; Robert A. Guy, Jr., Note, The
Nature and Constitutionality ofStallangLaws, 46 VAND. L. REV 991,996 (1993)
(indicating that an alarming number of women murdered each year were stalked
by attackers prior to being killed); Tamar Lewm, NewLawsAddress Old Problem:
The Terror ofa Stalker's Threats, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993, at Al.
I See Gershon, supra note 12, at 223 n.2; Morville, supra note 22, at 921 n.3,
927-31, see generally McAnaney et al., supra note 23; Keirsten L. Walsh,
Comment, Safe and Sound at Last? Federalized Anti-Stalking Legislation in the
United States and Canada, 14 DICK. J. INT'LL. 373 (1996). But see Long v. State,
931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (overturning the existing stalking law,
holding that it was void for vagueness). Recently, however, Texas enacted a new
stalking law that arguably contains the same vague language that caused the older
statute to be overturned. See S. 97,75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997). In 1996, the
Minnesota Supreme Court overturned a 1993 anti-stalking statute on grounds
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at combating stalking by creating a model state anti-stalking law It was
designed to evaluate state stalking statutes and to draft a model statute that
would pass constitutional muster.
26
As m cases of domestic violence, anti-abortiomsts follow, threaten,
injure, or sometimes even kill their victims. For example, neither Dr.
Gunn's nor Dr. Britton's murder was spontaneous - both doctors were
previously targeted by radical anti-abortion protesters.27 In other cases,
when physicians who perform abortions refuse to cease their activities,
protesters follow them to their homes and tell their neighbors they are
"baby killers."28 Protesters also follow the children of doctors who provide
abortions, taunting them about their parents' activities.29 While there is
little case law applying stalking statutes to anti-abortiomsts' activities,
these laws probably will be deemed a legitimate means of thwarting, and
perhaps ending, the intimidations, threats, and murders of physicians who
perform abortions.31
similar to those used in Texas. See Conrad de Fiebre, Anti-stallang Bill Sent to
House Floor Takes the Middle Ground, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan.
15, 1997 See generally Brant E. Poling, Comment, Stalking: Is the Law Hiding in
the Shadows of Constitutionality9, 23 CAP U. L. REV 279 (1994).
' See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (1996) (The Interstate Stalking Pumshment and
Presentation Act establishes a federal crime for stalking across state lines.);
Morville, supra note 22, at 932-34.
27 See Gershon, supra note 12, at 224 and accompanying notes (Just before Ins
murder, Dr. Gunn's picture appeared on a "wanted" poster; before Dr. Britton's
murder, Paul Hill began appearing outside the Pensacola, Florida women's clime
yelling "Mommy, please don't kill me!"); Klein, supra note 1, at A3; Pierre
Thomas, Abortion Rights Activists Ask Why Law Failed; Pensacola Slayings
Underscore Federal Agents' Difficulties in Preventing Clinic Violence, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at A3.
I See Richard Lacayo,Abortion; The Future Is Already Here; No Matter What
Happens to Roe v. Wade, the Doctors Who Perform Abortions and Their Patients
Face Formidable Obstacles, TIME, May 4, 1992, at 26,28-29.
29 See Gershon, supra note 12, at 220; The Shouting of the Lambs, TIME, May
4, 1992, at 30.
31 See Gershon, supra note 12, at 242-46 (suggesting that applying anti-stalking
laws to radical anti-abortion tactics will pass constitutional muster because such
statutes regulate conduct mixed with expression, which is not speech m and of
itself). Pro-abortion politicians also are stalked, not just to keep the issue of
abortion in the public eye, but also to embarrass pro-abortion politicians. See
JOSEPH M. SCHEIDLER, CLOSED - 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION 287-89 (rev. ed.
1993).
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One of the most successful means of ending abortionpractices has been
the use of blockades, that are designed to prevent access to facilities that
provide abortions. Since 1977, over 6000 of these climc blockades have
been reported. Many anti-abortiomsts engage m what they call "rescues,"
a form of blockade wherein men and women are held hostage m either a
health care facility or m their cars while in the parking lot of the facility 31
While captive, the hostages are taunted and vilified.32 Many of these
blockades and rescues culminate in intentional acts of physical harm to
health care providers.3 Rescue demonstrations create a substantial risk to
a climc's patients, who may suffer both physical and mental harm.34
However, with the recent enactment of the Freedom of Access to Climc
31 See S. REP NO. 103-117, at 7 (1993).
Climc blockades disrupt a wide range of health services, terrorize patients
and staff, and impose upon clinics, individuals and responding jurisdictions
millions of dollars in costs for law enforcement, prosecutions, staff
overtime, medical expenses and property damage. Typically dozens of
persons - and in some cases hundreds or even thousands - trespass onto
climc property and physically barricade entrances and exits, by sitting or
lying down or by standing and interlocking their arms. These human
barricades often involve pushing, shoving, destruction of equipment and
other violent acts as blockaders try to keep patients and staff from entering
the clime.
Id. See also David Cole, Commentary: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope, TEX.
LAw., Aug. 1, 1994, at 26.32 See S. REP NO. 103-117, at 8-9; NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F Supp.
1483 (E.D. Va.), affid, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub. nom. Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clime, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991), and rev'd npart,
506 U.S. 263 (1993). Operation Rescue is the organization most frequently
associated with the "rescue" tactic. The purpose of the "rescue" is to disrupt
operations at a chosen clime and ultimately to cause it to permanently cease
operations. See id. at 1488. As stated by Randall Terry, the founder of Operation
Rescue, "[W]hile the child-killing facility is blockaded, no one is permitted to enter
past the rescuers - all are prevented from entering the abortuary while the
rescue is in progress." Id. In its literature, Operation Rescue defines "rescues" as
"physically blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between
abortiomsts and the innocent victims." Id. (quoting Operation Rescue, National
Day ofRescue - Oct. 29, 1988 (1988)). The underlying purposes of the "rescue"
are threefold: "(i) to prevent abortions, (ii) to dissuade women from seeking a
climc's abortion services and (iii) to impress upon members of society the moral
righteousness and intensity of [Operation Rescue's] anti-abortion views." Id. See
also Sullivan, supra note 3.
33See S. REP No. 103-117, at 8-9 (1993).
3 See id.
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Entrances Act ("FACE"), the acts of anti-abortion protesters who attempt
to prevent abortions through blockades and rescues are questionable. 5
B. The Reason for Change
While the decision m Roe v. Wade 6 engendered fierce debate, it was
not necessarily a signal that the controversy over abortion would escalate
to such a degree that it would give way to the killing of abortion providers.
Marcy Wilder, Legal Director for the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League ("NARRAL"), states that the increased violence is
primarily attributable to two occurrences: the election of pro-choice
President Bill Clinton and the United States Supreme Court's affirmation
of abortion rights 7 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 3 1 Wilder argues that
these two events marked a setback m the anti-abortion movement's quest
to eradicate abortion. More importantly, however, it marked a split m the
movement. Those dissatisfied with the slow progress m ending abortion
turned to a rhetoric of violence and, ultimately, to the killing of abortion
providers.39
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994); Operation Rescue, 726 F Supp. at 1489. But see
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
36 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37 Interview with Marcy Wilder, Legal Director for NARRAL (Mar. 25, 1997);
see JAMES DAviSON HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR
DEMOCRACYINAMERICA'S CULTUREWAR20 (1994) (stating that with the election
of President Clinton many concluded that "the abortion controversy was for all
practical purposes over"). Hunter noted, however, that this and other events only
"ensure that the controversy will rage on" for some time "through different political
strategies." Id., see also Alissa Rubm, TheAbortion Wars Aren't Over; Beyond the
Court, Battles OverAccess and Restrictions Have Just Begun, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 1992, at C2; RANDALL A. TERRY, WHY DOES A NICE GUY LIKE ME KEEP
GETTING THROWN IN JAIL? 133-42 (1993) (opining that President Clinton is an
enemy of Chrstians and the pro-life movement). But see LIFE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, ABORTION-RELATED VIOLENCEANDALLEGED VIOLENCE (1995) (copy
on file with author). This report details the violence that has ensued m the abortion
"war" and concludes that there is very little violence committee by those who are
pro-life; however there is a great deal of violence committed by abortion rights
advocates and police against pro-life advocates.
38 Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a detailed discussion
of the impact of Casey, see Kelly Sue Henry, Note, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey- The Reaffirmation of Roe or the Beginning
of the End?, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 93 (1993/94).
39 See HUNTER, supra note 37, at 50-60 (noting that both the pro-life and pro-
choice movements have been guilty of rhetoric that engenders violence); Smolin,
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Although abortion has been at the center of American political debate
for more than twenty years, not until 1986 did zealous abortion opponents
openly begin to organize and discuss ways to end abortion.4° It was at that
time that Randall Terry revealed his plan for what became known as
Operation Rescue.4' Terry, now a prominent figure m the anti-abortion
movement, and Joseph Scheidler, founder of the Pro-Life Action Network
("PLAN") and consideredthe godfather of radical abortion opponents, both
denounced the violent tactics of the anti-abortion movement.42 However,
many claim that the rise m violence m the anti-abortion movement is
directly linked with the ascension of groups like Operation Rescue and
PLAN.43 To support the suspicion that the core of the radical anti-abortion
movement is violence, one can point to Terry's statement, "If you believe
abortion is murder, you must act like it's murder." This statement
implicitly indicates that Terry was mstructing his followers to use any
means necessary to end abortion. And by likening the fight to end abortion
to a "war,"' Terry indirectly instructed his followers to take up arms
against the enemy - those who "murder" unborn children by performing
abortions.
supra note 2, at 120 (suggesting that the absolutism of the anti-abortion movement
has led to the recent murders of physicians and others involved in the provision of
abortion services).
40 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 54 (indicating that one of the first meetings
took place m 1986 at a steak house in Pensacola, Florida. About 40 anti-abortion
activists were in attendance).
41 See RANDALL A. TERRY, ACCESSORY TO MURDER: THE ENEMIES, ALLIES,
AND ACCOMPLICES: TO THE DEATH OF OUR CULTURE 221-29 (1990) [hereinafter
TERRY, ACCESSORY TO MURDER]; RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE
(1988).
42 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 55; U.S. Marshals Guard Clinics: Anti-
abortion Violence Sparks Move, NEWSDAY, Aug. 2, 1994, at A5.
3 See David Van Biema, Your Activist, My Mobster (Supreme Court Allows
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act to Be Used Against Attacks on
Abortion Clinics), TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 32.
" Sullivan, supra note 3, at 237 (During an appearance on Donahue, Randall
Terry ended the interview on a highly emotional note, stating, "Abortion is murder!
If we don't bring an end to it, our country is going to be destroyed!"). Id. Operation
Rescue's slogan has also been stated as "If you think abortion is murder, act like
it!" Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 55.
45 TERRY, ACCESSORY TO MURDER, supra note 41, at 246. Similarly, David C.
Trosch, a Roman Catholic priest, stated, "Anyone in the war zone has to expect to
be part of the war that's going on." 2 Killed, 5 Hurt in Clinic Attacks, supra note
2, at Al.
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Although m 1990 Randall Terry resigned as director of Operation
Rescue and officially closed the doors of the orgamzation, 4 Ins efforts to
end abortion became more vocal. In a recent speech, Terry promised his
new "'leadership institute' would raise up 'a cadre of people who are
militant, who are fierce, who are unmerciful."', 7
Joseph Scheidler, an authoritative spokesperson for the anti-abortion
movement, states he does not condone violence and that he has clearly
written and spoken out against the use of violence in the fight against
abortion.48 He views violence as an admission of defeat and an acknowl-
edgment that abortion cannot be ended through proper channels.49
However, while Scheidler appeared to denounce the 1982 kidnapping of
Hector Zevallos and his wife as an act of a zealous anti-abortiomst,50 he
wrote a letter to the attorney representing the kidnapper, Don Benny
Anderson, suggesting a 'nationwide movement to seek Ins release."51
Many of the voices that resonate loudly in the fight to end abortion are
the voices of religious leaders, religious organizations, and those who
identify with the radical anti-abortion movement.52 They believe that
ending abortion is a moral imperative. For example, Michael Bray, a
former minister and the Washington, D.C. Operation Rescue coordinator,
has expressed Ins belief that the use of deadly force to end abortion is
morally justified. When rhetorically asked during an interview if it is
legitimate to use force on behalf of the unborn," Bray answered, "Yes, it
is justified to terminate an abortiomst. ' He repeated his belief when
called before a House subcommittee.55
4 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 51. While Randall Terry is no longer the
national director of Operation Rescue, he continues to maintain some connection
with a very sinilar organization, known as Operation Rescue National. See id.47 Kio Stark, Call it Pro-death, THE NATION, Aug. 22, 1994, at 183 (quoting
Randall Terry).48 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 54; SCHEIDLER, supra note 30, at 299-301
(1993) (discussing why violence will not work to end abortion).
49 See Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 54.50 See SCHEIDLER, supra note 30, at 299-300.
Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 55.
521 deffie "religious leaders" broadly and do not limit the definition solely to
clergy or the recognized ministers or heads of particular denominations.
53 See Naughton, supra note 3, at D1.
S4Id.
55 See S. REP No. 103-117, at 4 (1993); see also MICHAEL BRAY, A TIME TO
KILL 129-44 (1986) (among otherviolent anti-abortionists, Bray portrays as heroes
John Brockhoeft, Curtis Beseda, and Don Benny Anderson. Anderson and others
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Michael Bray is not alone in his beliefs. Paul J. Hill is a former pastor
of both the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Church of
America ("PCA"), and director of an anti-abortion group, Defensive
Action, which was established to promote the use of violence to end
abortion. He regularly espoused his belief that killing doctors who perform
abortions is justifiable homicide.56 Hill gained a broad audience for his
views, appearing on nationally televised programs including Nightline,
Donahue and Sonya Live. 7 In one interview he stated, "The Christian
principle is to do unto others as you would have them do unto you. If an
abortionist is about to violently take an innocent person's life, you are
entirely morally justified in trying to prevent him from taking that life."5 8
After a physician who provided abortions was shot and wounded m 1993,
Hill said the Sixth Commandment requires "that we try and prevent [sic]
killing, and requires that we use force if necessary to do that."59 More than
twenty-four religious leaders and leaders of city abortion rescue organmza-
tions signed a statement written by Hill stating that the use of deadly force
is justified.' Shortly after publicly revealing Ins belief in the theory of
justifiable homicide to defend those who kill abortion providers, Paul Hill
killed an abortion provider and his escort and stated, "I know one thing. No
innocent babies are going to be killed in that clinic today" ''
Implicitly, Hill and those who adopt his beliefs present themselves as
martyrs. Based on what they believe is a Christian directive, they will lay
down their own lives for the unborn, if necessary Those religious leaders
who support the use of deadly force to end abortion willingly elevate to the
status of martyr those who are bold enough to take such radical steps to end
abortion. David C. Trosch, a Catholic priest who was suspended from his
clerical duties for supporting violence in the fight against abortion,
defended Paul Hill, stating, "He's becoming more of a martyr. If he is
actually put to death, he will encourage even more violent protest against
abortionists and their climcs.
62
kidnaped an abortion provider and his wife and held them captive m order to
convince them to stop performing abortions); Hedges et al., supra note 1, at 52.
56 See Smothers, supra note 3, at 1, The Murder of "Baby Killers, " supra note
4, at A03; Cumden, supra note 4, at 26.
57 See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 57
58 Smothers, supra note 3, at 1, see Wattleton, supra note 2, at 90-91.
59 Smothers, supra note 3, at 1. Hill stated, "[A]ll godly action is necessary for
the taking of innocent life, including force." Kennedy, supra note 2, at 56.6o See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 56-57
61 Smothers, supra note 3, at 26.
62 Booth, supra note 1, at A3; see Rohter, supra note 1, at Al. There are those,
however, who are unwilling martyrs. Rohter notes that rather than accept the status
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H. THE LAW OF DEFENSE OF OTHERS
Part IH presents the development of the law of defense of others and
its common law and statutory origins. Also presented are the elements
necessary for a successful assertion of the defense. It concludes that a
crucial element of the defense is an illegal act, winch does not exist m the
context of anti-abortiomsts who kill abortion providers.
A. Common Law Ongins
The basic premise underlying the theory of defense ofothers is that one
is justified m using force to protect a third party from unlawful force by an
aggressor.63 The theory closely parallels the law of self-defense,64 winch
allows for the use of force to the extent necessary to save one's own life6 5
or to protect oneself from bodily harm.66
At English common law the rule of defense of others extended only to
the intervenor's family, winch was defined to include one's wife, child,
parent, or servant.67 Although the law of defense ofothers parallels the laws
of self-defense, it has its ongms in the right of a man to protect ins
property 68 William Blackstone, who believed the right to protect one's self
and one's property to be deeply entrenched in natural law, stated:
In these cases, if the party himselfor any of these Is relations, be forcibly
attacked m his person or property, it is lawful for hun to repel force by
force; and the breach of the peace, which happens, is chargeable upon him
only who began the affray.69
of martyr, Michael Griffin clams that mimster John Burt brainwashed him and
drove hun to kill Dr. Gunn. See id., Larry Rohter, Towenng Over the Abortion
Foe's Trial: His Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at 6C.
63See Commonwealth v. Martin, 341 N.E.2d 885, 889-90 (Mass. 1976).
SSeeAdkms v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.2d 1008, 1008 (Ky. 1943); see also
JOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 231-33 (2d ed. 1995).
65See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 719 S.W.2d 560,564 (Tex. Cnm. App. 1986).
See, e.g., Adkans, 168 S.W.2d at 1008.67 See Marin, 341 N.E.2d at 891-92.
68 See Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), affd, 451 A.2d
664 (Md. 1982); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ONTHE LAW
OF ENGLAND ch. 1, § 8(2) (1916) (noting that at common law one's acquiredrights
of property encompassed his wife, child, parent, or servant); ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1018-19 (3d ed. 1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 76 cmt. e (1965).
69 BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at ch. 1, § 7(1). Blackstone states the right to
self-defense "is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be
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In the course of time, however, the analogy of a man's right to protect
what was his - his property - eroded and was replaced by a "mutual and
reciprocal defense." 70 The household came to be regarded as aunit, and any
member had a privilege to defend any other member.71 This rule was
supplanted by a rule that recognmzed the right of one to protect anyone
"whom he is under a legal or socially recognized duty to protect."72
The English common law rule became deeply entrenched m American
jurisprudence 3 However, it eventually developed to permit a rule that
included crime prevention as a justification for homicide. 4 Since the
essence of the common law privilege of using force for crime prevention
was that anyone who was free from fault was authorized to use whatever
force was reasonably necessary to save an innocent victim75 from assault,
one needed no special privilege. One could take the life of a felomous
assailant if one reasonably believed it was necessary to save either an
innocent family member76 or a stranger.77 The early limit to the rule,
however, was that the privilege of using force for crime prevention did not
allow for intervention to protect third persons from invasions that did not
involve danger of death or serious bodily injury 71 Over time, the law of
defense of others developed to provide authority to act even where there
was no felomous assault.79 The privilege to use force for crime prevention
presently extends to circumstances that include non-felomous personal
m fact, taken away by the law of society." Id.
70 Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150, 176 (1860) (holding that "[a] man may defend
Ins family, his servants or Ins master, whenever he may defend himself').
71 See id., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 76(b)(1) (1934) and
accompanying illustrations 4 and 5.
7 Pond, 8 Mich. at 176.
7 See Marco F Bendinelli & James T. Edsall, Defense of Others: Ongns,
Requirements, Limitations and Ramifications, 5 REGENT U. L. REV 153, 155-56
(1995); MODELPENALCODE § 3.05 cmt. 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962; Revised
Commentary 1985).
74 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (1962).
75 See id.
76 See Lacy v. State, 297 P 872 (Anz. 1931) (any other family member);
Warnack v. State, 60 S.E. 288 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (brother); Crowder v. State, 76
Tenn. 669 (1881) (parent, child).
7 See State v. Hennessy, 90 P 221 (Nev. 1907); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05
cmt. 1 (1962); Bendinelli & Edsal, supra note 73, at 156 n.20 and accompanying
text.
78 See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 68, at 1145; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 76, cmt. e (1965).79 See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 68, at 1145.
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attacks.8° The law of defense of others and the privilege to use force for
crime prevention probably exist independently, and both privileges may be
asserted where appropriate.8 '
As the law of defense of others developed, it became intertwined with
the law of self-defense.82 If someone is using privileged force in order to
defend himself against an unlawful attack, a third party is authorized to
defend him and may use force in an effort to save inm. 3 In other words,
"the right of one to defend another is coextensive with the right of the other
to defend hunself. 8 4
Two distinct standards developed regarding the potential liability
encountered when one individual came to the aid of another. One line of
reasoning, based on the theory of self-defense, held that he who comes to
the defense of another "stands in the shoes" of the one defended and
possesses no greater privilege than the one on whose behalf he intervenes.8 5
This principle, sometimes referred to as the "alter ego" rule,8 6 was based
upon the theory that one is not justified in using deadly force in self-
defense if one is at fault.8 7 The other theory, which takes amore subjective
80 See Spicer v. People, 11 Ill. App. 294, 297 (1882) (holding use of force
justified to prevent misdemeanors such as fighting or other breach of the peace);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(5) (1962) (allowing force in crime prevention for "a
crime involving or threatening bodily injury, damage to or loss of property or a
breach of the peace"); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 68, at 1145.
81 See Hennessy, 90 P at 227; WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.9, at 465 (2d ed. 1986).
' See Lovejoy v. State, 15 So. 2d 300,301 (Ala. Ct. App. 1943); Bendinelli &
Edsall, supra note 73, at 156 n.21.
13 See Steele v. State, 389 So. 2d 591 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); People v. Travis,
56 Cal. 251 (1880), overruled npart by People v. Conkling, 44 P. 314 (Cal. 1896);
State v. Turner, 152 S.W 313 (Mo. 1912).
4 Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 156; see also Lovejoy, 15 So. 2d at
301.
15 See Wood v. State, 29 So. 557, 558 (Ala. 1900); see also People v. Young,
183 N.E.2d 319, 319-30 (N.Y 1962) (upholding a conviction for third degree
assault despite the defendant's good faith intervention in a fight between a third
person and a policeman).
16 See Young, 183 N.E.2d at 319; State v. Clarello, 174 A.2d 506, 511 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 157-58. The
"stands-m-the-shoes," "alter-ego," and "acts-at-his-own-peril" rules are used
interchangeably to describe the liability of an intervenor who is mistaken as to the
rights of the one on whose behalf he intervenes. See id.
17 See Chiarello, 174 A.2d at 511 (holding that a homicide is not justified in
such a case if the defender is at fault in occasioning the difficulty); Wood, 29
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approach to defense of others, is the "reasonable appearance" or "reason-
able belief" rule, winch holds that an mtervenor who acts in defense of
another is not liable if his actions were reasonable under the
circumstances."
Under the stands-m-the-shoes theory, if the defended person was
at fault in any way, he lost the right to self-defense. Thus, anyone acting
on his behalf lost the right to be relieved of liability because Ins actions
were justified.8 9 For example, in Wood v. State,90 the Alabama Supreme
Court considered whether a defendant who came to the aid of his brother,
who was the initial aggressor, was justified in shooting the victim, with
whom his brother was engaged in an altercation. 91 The court later reaf-
firmed its ruling in Lovejoy v. State,92 holding: "[H]e who invokes self-
defense in protection of a third person is placed in the shoes of him whom
he seeks to protect."'93 He is on no greater plane than the one he seeks to
aid.94
There are two chiefpublic policy considerations underlying the theory
that an intervenor "acts at Ins own peril." One is that it would be dangerous
for police officers to allow an individual to intervene in a rightful arrest,
even if the intervenor does not have the specific intent necessary to be
So. at 558.8 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
89 See Wood, 29 So. at 558 (affirmmg conviction although defendant came to
his brother's aid, without knowledge that Ins brother confronted the victim about
a prior incident); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962;
Revised Commentary 1985); Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 157 and
accompanying notes.
0 Wood v. State, 29 So. 557 (Ala. 1900).
9, See id. at 558.
One who intervenes in a pending difficulty in behalf of a brother, and takes
the life of the other original combatant, stands in the shoes of the brother in
respect of fault [of the brother] in bringing on the difficulty, and cannot
defend upon the ground that [the] brother was in imminent and deadly peril
and could not retreat, unless the latter could have defended on that ground
had he killed his assailant. Hence it is a material inquiry whether
defendant's brother was at fault m bringing on the difficulty.
Id.
92 Lovejoy v State, 15 So. 2d 300, 301 (Ala. Ct. App. 1943); see also
Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 156.
93 Lovejoy, 15 So. 2d at 301 (quoting Humphries v. State, 181 So. 309, 310
(Ala. Ct. App. 1938)).94 See id.
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convicted of a crime.9s A second argument against extending protection to
someone who intervened to defend another is that to justify the acts of a
defendant who, at the time of the affray, had a reasonable belief that the
one he was defending was without fault might result in allowing the killing
of an innocent person without any crimnal liability on the part of the
killer.9 6 While both policies appear sound when viewed m the context of
preventing the hampering of law enforcement, both policies are untenable
when balanced against principles of fairness and justice. The law has
always recognized circumstances where one who caused a homicide was
free of criminal intent and, therefore, free of guilt.97
The harshness of the "alter ego" rule led courts to follow the American
Law Institute in rejecting the rule as repugnant to the fundamental principle
of Anglo-American crminal jurisprudence - that the defendant must have
a guilty mind or guilty intent in order to incur criminal liability." As a
result, many jurisdictions replaced the rule with a more lement standard
known as the "reasonable belief" rule, which holds that so long as the
defendant reasonably believes another is unlawfully attacked, heisjustified
in using reasonable deadly or non-deadly force to defend him.
9 See People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962).
It would be a dangerous precedent for courts to announce that plain-clothes
police officers attempting lawful arrests over wrongful resistance are
subject to violent interference by strangers ignorant of the facts, who may
attack the officers with unpunity so long as their ignorance forms a
reasonable basis for a snap judgment of the situation unfavorable to the
officers.
People v. Young, 210 N.Y.S.2d 358, 367 (1961) (Valente, J., dissenting).
96 See State v. Clharello, 174 A.2d 506,510 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1961).
97 "'The sense of justice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of
punishment which is substantial upon those innocent of intentional or negligent
wrongdoing; and law in the last analysis must reflect the general community sense
ofjustice.' "Id. at 514 (quoting Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM.
L. REv 55, 70 (1933)).
98See id. at 510.
9 See Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 885-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), affid,
451 A.2d 664 (Md. 1982) (holding that defendant, a prisoner who assaulted a
correctional officer, had a viable defense if it reasonably appeared to him that the
otherprisoner was being unlawfully beaten); Mayhew v. State, 144 S.W. 229 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1912) (holding it was error to instruct the jury that one may act in
defense of another only if the one being defended would be justified m defending
himself; rather, it is the defendant's own intent that governs if he reasonably
believes that another needs aid and he is therefore entitled to act on that belief, even
if the belief is erroneous); DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 232; Bendinelli & Edsall,
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In Alexander v. State,100 the court, drawing upon the circumstances
surrounding the brutal killing of Catherine "Kitty" Genovese, 0' presented
one of the most compelling reasons for rejecting the "alter ego" rule.
Genovese was repeatedly stabbed while onlookers turned their backs to
avoid witnessing the attack or closed their windows to drown out her
screams of anguish.' °2 The court noted that while witnesses may have been
motivated by fear, they excused their inaction by reasoning that the law did
not protect an intervenor from criminal liability if the one being protected
was the initial aggressor, notwithstanding how misleading the circum-
stances may have been. 103 In abandoning the alter ego rule, Judge Lowe
embracedthe reasonable-appearance rile on utilitarian grounds, noting that
a consequence of the act-at-peril doctrine was that citizens hesitate to
intervene. 04 The reasonable-appearance rule seeks "to afford protection to
a defendant who acts while injury may still be prevented. "105 Other
courts reject the alter ego rule on retributive grounds, meaning that "one
should not be convicted of a crime if [one] selflessly attempts to protect the
victim of an apparently unjustified assault, [but h]ow else can we encour-
age bystanders to go to the aid of another who is being subjected to an
assault?""° Imposing liability under these circumstances violates concepts
of "just desserts" because the rule imposes liability without fault.107 The
reasonable-appearance rule ensures that people who act reasonably, even
if mistakenly, are not punished for their good motives. ' With the
supra note 73, at 158-59; Valerie Couch, Note, 35 OKLA. L. REV 141 (1982);
Recent Case, 8 MINN. L. REV 340 (1923-1924); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation,
Construction andApplication ofStatutes Justifying the Use ofForce to Prevent the
Use ofForce Against Another, 71 A.L.R.4TH 940, 947 (1989).
" Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd, 451 A.2d 664
(Md. 1982).
101 See id.
102 See id. at 881.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 881-83. Judge Lowe reasoned, "[T]he onlookers hesitated to
become involved in the fracas at their legal peril. Even if their hearts had been stout
enough to enter the fray in defense of a stranger being violently assaulted, the fear
of legal consequences chilled their better instincts." Id. at 881. See also DRESSLER,
supra note 64, at 232.
1o5 Alexander, 447 A.2d at 887; see also DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 232.
106 State v Fair, 211 A.2d 359, 368 (N.J. 1965).




' See Alexander, 447 A.2d at 883 (pointing out that the alter ego rule "forces
a Good Samaritan to gamble not only us health but his freedom and reputation,
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exception of Oio, all Amencanjurisdictions have abandoned the alter ego
rule.109
B. Defense of Others Under the Model Penal Code
The MPC appears to have shaped the development of the law of
defense of others primarily by renouncing the harshness of the alter ego
rule and supporting an approach which requires the showing of mens rea
or guilty intent in order to burden an intervenor with criminal liability. 10
The drafters of the MPC argued that, at common law, criminal negligence
encompassed more than civil negligence in that it implied a wide departure
from the reasonableness standard.' In other words, for a mistake to
disallow the successful assertion of justification, it must be more than
unreasonable - it must be grossly unreasonable." 2 The drafters reasoned
that without criminal intent, "a person should not be convicted of a crime
of intention where he has labored under a mistake that, had the facts been
as he supposed, would have left him free from guilt."" 3 The Code refused
to impose liability without fault where one acts in good faith and uses due
care. 114
Since the drafters of the Code incorporated the law of self-defense in
the law of defense of others, it is important to review provisional sections
3.04, 3.05, and 3.09 in order to understand the drafters' refusal to unpose
liability upon an intervenor without fault.
and overlooks the likelihood that the mtervenor might have acted entirely without
mens rea, and perhaps even with the highest sense of duty[, not as a] willing
participant in a brawl") (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 10 18-19 (2d
ed. 1969)); DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 232.
09 See State v. Hussmg, No. 63838, 1994 WL 24289 (Oluo Ct. App. Jan. 27,
1994), appeal dismissed, 640 N.E.2d 846 (Oluo 1994); Bendinelli & Edsail, supra
note 73, at 159.
"
0 See Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 160; State v. Cluarello, 174 A.2d
506, 510 (N.L Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958).




"' See Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 160. The prevailing view held a
mistaken intervenor criminally liable. See Chiarello, 174 A.2d at 511, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.05 cmt 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962; Revised Commentary
1985).
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Under section 3.04, Use ofForce in Self-Protection,'5 it is the actor's
subjective belief, not the facts as they actually exist, that controls. 16 If one
asserting self-defense does so based on a mistaken belief and is reckless or
negligent in forming that belief, one may then be prosecuted only for an
offense of recklessness or negligence under section 3.09 11 7"[I]f an actor
makes a negligent mistake in assessing the need for self-defensive action,
he cannot be prosecuted for an offense that requires purpose to establish
culpability."118
The basic premse underlying section 3.04 is that one is justified m
using force for self-preservation when one believes that it is immediately
necessary to protect oneself against the unlawful force of another.1 9 Both
common law and statutory law require that the actor believes defensive
action is necessary, and that he use no more force than is necessary to
prevent the peril.120
115 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962).
116 See id. § 3.04 explanatory note.
117 See id.
"I Id. The drafters of section 3.04 intended to reflect three general principles
in creating statutory justifications for the use of force.
[First was the] desirability of eliminating anomalous distinctions among
similar justifications. [Second was to create] standards of culpability
governing the absence of facts to justify the use of force [so that they]
parallel[ed] the standards governing other material elements of an
offense. The third principle is that the circumstances in wluch acts of
force and of deadly force will be justified should be specified in some
detail.
Id.
The drafters believed that ultimately,
the law on this subject could influence behavior and moral perspectives,
encouraging members of the community not to employ force when
immediate emotional reaction might support its use but enlightened
morality would reject it. The alternative of a general standard of
reasonableness would largely forfeit these advantages and would leave
judgment to the uninstructed responses to particular juries.
Id.
"I See id. § 3.04 cmt. 2(d). As pointed out in the Code, it is sufficient that one
believes force is unlawful. The parameters of his actions, however, are governed
by section 3.09. See id.
"'See id. § 3.04 cmt. 2(a). The drafters note thatjunsdictions generally require
a reasonable ground for one's belief in the necessity for using force. The
consequences are that in some jurisdictions a mistaken belief about the necessity
of force or the degree of force used might exculpate a defendant. See id. In other
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Under the MPC, the principles that govern self-defense parallel those
that govern section 3.05, Defense of Others."' One must meet three
requirements in order to successfiully assertjustification for the use of force
in the defense of others. First, as with self-defense under section 3.04, the
actor is justified in using force to protect a third party if he could use the
same force to protect himself.'2 In other words, he is privileged to use the
amount of force he could use to protect himself.2 3 Second, under the
circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the third party would be
justified in using protective force. 24 If, for example, a third party were
resisting arrest by a known officer, he would have no defense; and if
someone seeking to intervene knew the circumstances, he likewise would
have no defense."z Third, the actor believes that the intervention is
necessary to protect another.'26 Tius requirement underlies all use of
defensive force under the Code.'27 As with section 3.04, section 3.05 sought
to avoid liability without fault. 28 The drafters realized that an actor would
refrain from acting if he knew his maccurate assessment of the circum-
stances would be punishable even without fault. 29 As a result, they deemed
it farpreferable to predicate thejustification on the actor's beliefs.130 Where
the actor was reckless or negligent in forming his beliefs about the
circumstances, section 3.09 imposes liability proportional to the degree of
fault.13 '
jurisdictions, however, the actor's negligence might remove the right to assert any
defense and might permit a conviction for an intentional action, even murder. See
id. The driving theme in the MPC, particularly sections 3.04,3.05, and 3.09, is that
the second result is wrong. The drafters note that it is wrong to place one who acts
negligently or recklessly on equal footing with one who kills intentionally for
financial gain, for example. See id. One with a lesser culpability should be
protected in a criminal code rather than have his fate left to the whims of a
prosecutor. See id.
12 See id. § 3.05; Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 161.
12 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 explanatory note (1962); Bendinelli &
Edsall, supra note 73, at 161.
'2 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 explanatory note (1962).
24 See id.
"-
5 See rd. § 3.05 cmt. 1.
6 See id. § 3.05 explanatory note.




3 See id. For a discussion of the importance of section 3.09, see infra note 132.
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While section 3.04 parallels section 3.05 m its requirements for
propriety of defensive action, the analysis of these sections is mcomplete
without a discussion of section 3.09, Mistake of Law, which takes into
account the actor's culpability when evaluating claims of self-defense and
defense of others. In essence, 3.09 serves as the gatekeeper for defendants
who have acted without intent but whose actions cannot completely
exculpate them under the circumstances.1 2
The Code affords broad protection to an intervenor, thus preventing a
prosecution for murder when an accused acts by negligent mistake. Section
3.09 limits the prosecution to either reckless or negligent homicide when
an actor has been reckless or negligent in forming his belief.133 This
treatment is in stark contrast to many of the pre-Code formulations, which
required both a belief in the justifying circumstances as well as the
132 See MODELPENAL CODE § 3.09. This section was presented to the American
Law Institute m Tentative Draft No. 8 and considered at the May 1958 meeting. It
was again presented to the Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at
the May 1962 meeting. The section reads as follows:
Section 309. Mistake of Law as to Unlawfulness of Force or Legality of
Arrest; Reckless or Negligent Use of Otherwise Justifiable Force; Reckless
or Negligent Injury or Risk of Injury to Innocent Persons.
(1) The justification afforded by Sections 3.04 to 3.07, inclusive, is
unavailable when:
(a) the actor's belief m the unlawfulness of the force or conduct
agamst which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness
of an arrest that he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and
(b) his error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the
Code, any other provision of the criminal law or the law governing the
legality of an arrest or search.
(2) When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the
person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief
would establish ajustification under Section 3.03 to 3.08 but the actor is
reckless or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring or failing to
acquire any knowledge or belief that is material to the justifiability of his
use of force, the justification afforded by those Sections is unavailable m a
prosection for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability.
(3) When the actor isjustified under Sections 3.03 to 3.08 in using force
upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently
Injures or creates a risk of mjury to innocent persons, the justification
afforded by those Sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such
recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.
133 See id. § 3.09 cmt. 2; Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 163.
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reasonableness of that belief.1 34 The MPC, however, focuses on the
inequity of a person being convicted of a crime of intention where he has
labored under a mistake and where, had the facts been as he believed, he
would have been free from guilt.135 "Where the crime otherwise requires
greater culpability for a conviction, it is neither fair nor logical to convict
when there is only negligence as to the circumstances that would establish
ajustification."'136 The solution is simplyto remove such situations from the
category of purposeful crimes and deal with them as cases of recklessness
or negligence.!37 Ultimately, "recklessness and negligence as to the factors
that establish justification [are treated similarly to] recklessness or
negligence as to the other material elements of the offense involved."'38
The drafters of the Code, however, did not embrace the position that "any
honest belief as to justification" served to exculpate "an actor from
conviction for crimes of negligence and recklessness as well as crimes of
purpose."'139
The purpose of the Code was not to relieve-an actor from all liability
when the circumstances indicate he was reckless or negligent in his actions.
Rather, the Code sought to protect him from a higher degree of liability
when it was not warranted. In combination, sections 3.04, 3.05, and 3.09
limit such liability, refusing to attribute a higher degree of culpability
without the requisite mental state, and thereby preventing unjust results.
C. Justification for Using Deadly Force in Defense ofAnother" Basic
Requirements
While only five states have adopted statutes that closely parallel the
MPC, 1 ° all states with defense-of-other statutes have adopted the Code's
philosophy,' 4' which encourages "Good Samaritans." Such an individual
may intervene on behalf of another without fear of reprisal if his assess-
ment of the circumstances, although maccurate, was nonetheless well-





13 1 Id., see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 81, § 5.8, at 463-64.
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 cmt. 2 (1962) (emphasis added). Glanville
Williams urged the complete exculpation of one who had an honest belief as to
justification, indicating that negligence was not a useful legal concept under these
circumstances. See id.
'
4o See Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 164 n.56.
411d. at 164, 175 and accompanying notes.
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reasoned.'42 Most states that have not taken legislative action on this issue
have adopted some form of defense-of-others justification by judicial
decision.143
When a defendant has gone to the aid of another and acted reasonably,
his expectation is not just that his actions will be excused,'" meaning that
although his conduct caused a social harm,145 the law "pardons his unlawful
conduct as the product of a non-culpable state of mind."'" The defendant,
142 See Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 887 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), afifd, 451
A.2d 664 (Md. 1982); State v. Chiarello, 174 A.2d 506, 514-15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div 1961).
143 See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 133, at 101 (1984)
(giving complete listing of the states that have adopted the defense-of-others
justification by statute or case law).
144See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 189-94; Peter Arenella, Character, Choice
and Moral Agency: The Relevance of.Character to Our Moral Culpability
Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. &POL'Y 59,62 (Spring 1990); PeterAreneHa, Convicting
the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral
Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV 1511 (1992); Michael Corrado, Notes on the
Structure ofa Theory ofExcuses, 82 J. CRM. L. &CRiMINoLOGY465 (1991); Anne
M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV 1 (1994); Joshua Dressler,
Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671 (1988); George P Fletcher, The
Individualization ofExcusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV 1269 (1974); Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV 1897 (1984); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a
General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193-94 (1993); Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257 (1987); Michael S. Moore, Causation andthe Excuses,
73 CAL. L. REV 1091 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, andExcuse,
7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, 29 (Spring 1990); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and
Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv 1587 (1994); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of
DeservedPunishment: AnEssay on Choice, Character, andResponsibility, 67 IND.
L.J. 719 (1992); Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 CRiM. L. REV
732; Deborah W Denno, Comment, Human Biology and CriminalResponsibility:
Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV 615 (1988); Peter D.W Heberling,
Note, Justfication: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75
COLuM. L.REv. 914 (1975); George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and
Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987).
145 See Joshua Dressler, Justification and Excuses: A Brief Review of the
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV 1155, 1162-63 (1987).
146 Heberling, supra note 144, at 916-17; Dressler, supra note 145, at 1163
(noting that what the defendant states when asserting an excuse defense is that "I
admit, or you have proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that I did something that I
should not have done, but I [still] should not be held crminally accountable for my
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instead, seeks to have his actions justified. By this he seeks recognition that
Ins actions were not wrong but rather were, m fact, morally right and
socially appropriate. 147 In essence, the defendant is seeking society's
collective seal of approval for his conduct.
Yet, due to the value of human life and one's right not to be killed,14
and because an mtervenor's actions may result m death or serious bodily
injury, the defendant must meet a high standard before society finds his
actions justified and wipes his slate clean. Before society extends such
broad protection to a defendant, society must be certam that the defendant's
conduct is warranted.
actions").
14 7 See JL. AUSTIN, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (Herbert Moms ed.,
1961) (stating that justified conduct is viewed as "a good thing, or the right or
sensible thimg, orapermissible thing to do. "); Heberling, supra note 144, at 916
(noting that ajustification defense defines "that conduct, otherwise cnminal, which
under the circumstances is socially acceptable and which deserves neither criminal
liability nor even censure"); see also DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 182.
Dressier suggests four main theories ofjustification under which the law does
not condemn an act and may even welcome it. See id. at 186.
First, the "public benefit" theory indicates that conduct was notjustified unless
it was performed for the public's benefit. See id. at 187 Generally, this theory was
limited to the actions of public officers. See id.
A second theory ofjustification is "moral forfeiture," which is based upon the
view that people possess certain moral rights and interests that society recognizes,
such as the right to life. These rights, however, may be forfeited. Dressler points
out that this theory is morally troubling to some people because it ignores the
simple moral principle that human life is sacred. See id. at 188.
The "moral rights" theory asserts that the actor is justified because he has an
affirmative right to protect a particular moral interest. The law treats the
defendant's conduct as affirmatively proper. See id.
A final theory, the "superior interest" or "less harm" theory, authorizes the
conduct when the interests of the defendant outweigh the interest of the person he
harms. Society permits the balancing of a non-infenor interest of the defendant
against the victim's right or interest. See id. at 188-89. What is most important
about this theory of justification is that it is "consistent with the utilitarian goal of
promoting individual conduct that reduces overall harm." Id.
148 See Eric Rakowski, Talang and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REV 1063
(1993). Rakowski states that people should always be treated as ends m themselves
and neverjust as a means to enhance the welfare of others. By this he means that,
at a m munm, people may notbe killed simply to satisfy another's desire. Further,
they should not be killed against their will so that another person may live unless
they would have been killed m any event and, ifpossible, were fairly selected. See
id. at 1104-08, 1129-41.
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Generally, the standards that apply to self-defense also apply to defense
of others. 49 Only a small number of critics propose that more stringent
standards should be applied to one who goes to the aid of another, on the
ground that the action involves an inherent risk of injury to innocent parties
and the intervening actor's conduct is wholly voluntary 150 In balancing the
equities, however, most courts and legislatures have concluded that "the
value protected - the preservation of life or health - outweighs the risks
involved, and the need to encourage such action is paramount. ",151
While there is no precise language common to all judicial decisions
and legislative enactments addressing justification based on defense of
others, the following basic, objective criteria must be taken into account
when assessing the appropriateness of the defendant's actions.
1. Necessity
An important element in successfully asserting a defense-of-others
justification is necessity The rule provides that force should not be used to
defend another unless, and only to the extent that, it is necessary 152 The
rule, then, provides that an actor must satisfy two requirements. Part one's
encompasses the "when" requirement, which asserts that an actor cannot
use force if it would be equally effective if asserted at a later time and the
actor would suffer no harm by waiting. 54
In definmg when defensive force is necessary, many states require that
the threat of harm from the aggressor be "imminent," which simply means
that an intervenor cannot act until the party whom the intervenor is
defending is immediately threatened.115 Where the use of deadly force
results in homicide, courts have defined "imminent" to mean "near at hand,
mediate rather than immediate, close rather than touching."'156 And as noted
49 See Heberling, supra note 144, at 932.
'
50 See id. at 932-33.
15, Id. at 933.
152 See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 199-200 (stating that one may not use
deadly force to prevent an ninment deadly attack if a nondeadly response is
sufficient); see also ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 131(c), at 77
3 For a discussion of the second part, proportionality, see znfra notes 162-66
and accompanying text.
154 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 13 1(c), at 77
155 For a detailed list of states requiring that a threat be "imminent" in order to
justify homicide, see Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 168 n.80; ROBINSON,
supra note 143, § 131(b), at 76.
156 Scholl v. State, 115 So. 43, 44 (Fla. 1927); see Bendinelli & Edsall, supra
note 73, at 168-69.
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m State v. Daniels,5 7 the focus of inquiry as to whether harm is "imminent"
is the aggressor's threatened conduct and not the defendant's response to
it.5 8 This requirement reflects an underlying policy that only imminent
harm necessitates an immediate response. 159 Criminal law scholarProfessor
Robinson, however, argues that under some circumstances the focus should
not be on the immediacy of the threat, but rather the immediacy of the
response necessary in defense."6 He notes that, "[i]f a threatened harm is
such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last
moment, the principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier - as
early as is required to defend himself [or another] effectively " 161
2. Proportionality
The second prong of necessity dictates that force can be used only "to
the extent" that it is necessary This is known as the "proportionality" rule,
which provides that one is not justified in using force that is excessive in
relation to the harm threatened. 62 The underlying public policy consider
"I State v. Daniels, 682 P.2d 173 (Mont. 1984).
158 See id. at 181-82; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 81, § 5.7(d), at 458 n.35.
59 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 131(c)(1), at 78.
160 See id. Robinson notes that there may be a reason to act where harm is not
imminent. For example, A kidnaps and confines B and indicates that he will kill
him one week later. Each morning whenA brings him food, B has the opportunity
to kill A and escape. Under the literal meaning of "imminent," B would have to
wait until A is "standing over him with a knife." Id. Robinson argues that this
outcome is inappropriate. If the purpose "is to exclude threats of harm that are too
remote to require a response," the issue is resolved by requiring that the response
be necessary. See id. Some courts use the term "immediate" rather than
"imminent." However, some scholars argue that the two words are not precisely
interchangeable, particularly in the battered woman context. See Holly Maguigan,
Battered Women and Self-D efense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV 379, 414-16 (1991); ROBINSON, supra note 143, §
13 l(c)(1), at 78-79. Professor Robinson indicates that the term "immediate" is less
problematic than using the term "imminent." But use of "immediate" is also
imprecise because it fails to highlight the "to-the-extent-necessary" requirement
and focuses on "when" defensive conduct is proper. See id. at 78. He further notes
that the term may be repetitive since the issue really is whether the defendant's
conduct is or is not necessary See id. at 78-79.
161 ROBINSON, supra note 143, at 78.
'
62 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 81, at 455-56; ROBINSON, supra note 143,
§ 131(d), at 81-84; see also State v. Metcalfe, 212 N.W 382, 386 (Iowa 1927)
(holding that degree of force used must be reasonably necessary under the
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ations appear to include both a desire to avoid harm that may be justified
and yet still be avoidable, and a desire to minimize mistakes as to the
existence ofjustifymg circumstances. ' 63 Accordingly, a person goingto the
aid of another cannot use deadly force to prevent a nondeadly attack, even
if the deadly force is necessary to prevent a battery 16 As with the "when"
requirement, there is no universal statutory term used to describe the
appropriate degree of force to be used m a given situation.' 65 However,
most jurisdictions have enacted legislation that enumerates specified
situations in which deadly force is or is not permitted or when it is or is not
reasonable m relationship to the harm threatened.' 66
3. Reasonable Belief
The thread that ties together the elements necessary to establish
justification under the defense of others is reasonable belief. This standard
dictates that one is not justified m using force to defend a third party unless
one actually and reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent
an immnent and unlawful attack on another. In order to assess whether an
intervenor's actions were warranted, the majority of jurisdictions have
adopted an objective standard that examines the reasonableness of a
defendant's belief- whether his actions were necessary due to an imminent
threat of danger to another. 167 The principle extends to defendants who
make a mistaken, but reasonable, assessment about the need to intervene
with force.' 68
In determining the reasonableness of an mtervenor's actions, the
majority approach requires more than an assessment of subjective belief.
Therefore, the inquiry does not end simply because the defendant actually
believed that force was necessary 169 A fact-finder must also determine if
the defendant meets objective criteria- whether the defendant's belief was
circumstances; one cannot take the life of a wrongdoer for ordinary trespass.).
163 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 13 1(e), at 88.
1' See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 200. Dressier uses the following example
to illustrate the point: "[I]f V threatens to strike D on a public road, and the only
way that D can avoid the battery is to push V into the way of a fast-moving car, D
must abstain, and seek compensation for the battery after the fact" Id.
165 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 131(d)(1), at 82.
166 See id. § 131(d)(1), (2), at 82-84.
167 See Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 173-74.
168 See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 199-200.
169 See Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 175.
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reasonable based on the circumstances. 7 ° If it is determined that an
mtervenor honestly and yet unreasonably believed force was necessary to
defend another, he cannot avail himself of the defense-of-others justifica-
tion.'7' Some states, however, permit a mistaken but unreasonable belief to
lessen the charge of a killing by an intervenor from murder to manslaugh-
ter.172
Jurisdictions that do not adopt the majority approach employ a number
of different standards that focus on the intervenor's use of deadly force in
defending third parties. For example, two states require that a defendant's
use of deadly force be actually necessary before it is deemed justified.1in
While this standard seems inflexible, courts having the opportunity to
strictly enforce the actual necessity requirement have not done so. These
courts opt, instead, for an interpretation that permits an assessment of a
defendant's reasonable belief."
The remaining jurisdictions rely upon one of the following standards
to establish reasonableness: reasonable ground and imminent danger,
reasonable persons, actual belief plus reasonable ground, and the actor's
belief, which is the MPC standard. 75 While the foregoing represent
'
7
' See id., David v. State, 698 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
171 See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 200.
172 See id., see ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 13 1(c), at 77
"3 See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03, -04, -07 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 2305 (1974 and Supp. 1996); Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 178.
174 See Alexander v State, 447 A.2d 880, 887 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), affd, 451
A.2d 664 (Md. 1982); Lambert v. State, 519 A.2d 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(indicating that the defendant must be judged on the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared to him and on the reasonableness of his perceptions); State v
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,820 (N.D. 1983) (indicating that the defendant should
be judged based on her good faith honest belief and the reasonableness of that
belief); State v Wheelock, 609 A.2d 972, 975 (Vt. 1992) (reasoning that the
defendant must have an honest belief that is grounded in reason); see also
Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 179-80.
11 For a comprehensive analysis of the various statutory constructions, see
Bendinelli & Edsall, supra note 73, at 180-88.
The actor's belief standard is worthy ofbrief discussion because it presents the
most subjective standard of reasonableness and is adopted directly from the Model
Penal Code (' MPC"). As with the MPC, jurisdictions that use a subjective standard
temper the standard's effects by indicating that a person may still be criminally
liable if his conduct is reckless or negligent. Even those jurisdictions that appear
to completely reject the reasonable person standard, replacing it with "actually
believes" language, continue to use the reasonable person test as a factor to be
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differing standards of belief required to justify homicide committed in
defense of others, courts in the various jurisdictions limit, expand, or
contradict the chosen statutory language, often adopting the reasonable
belief standard employed by the majority 176
4. UnlawfulAct
"In order to trigger a defensive force defense the aggressor must
unjustifiably threaten harm to" a third party 177 To this end, when one acts
considered in determining reasonableness. See Heberling, supra note 144, at 919-
20.
Critics of the MPC's subjective standard of belief argue that "[a]lthough the
MPC advocates the proper standard of liability for acts based on culpable beliefs
[by] insisting that [one's] liability should never exceed [one's] degree of
culpability," the MPC does not logically reach this conclusion. Id. at 919. For
example, under the MPC, where a defendant acts with a mistaken but reasonable
belief, the MPC justifies rather than excuses the conduct. This approach leads to
the mconsistent assertion that mere belief is sufficient to establish a defense of
justification "and that a culpable belief does not forfeit the defense but simply
requires a lesser defensive claim. [It implies the anomalous concept of a
defense that does not negate liability." Id. (footnote omitted). The implications of
the Code's position, that a defense continues to exist even though the belief upon
which it is based is culpable, may have served as the impetus for most codes to
reject the "actual belief' standard m favor of the "reasonable belief' rule. The Code
requires that an intervenor with an unreasonable belief forfeit the defenses of
justification and excuse and become liable as if he had committed a purposeful
offense. See id.
Heberling also argues that once the absence of reasonable belief is proven,
liability is determined according to the intent of the act without further
reference to the quality of the belief. The result is unsatisfactory both in
terms of theory and justice. Theoretically, this approach equates a defense
of excuse based on wrongful belief with other defenses of excuse by failing
to recognize that belief is not an absolute condition, like insanity, which
either qualifies an act completely or not at all. It is also unjust to subject a
person who honestly but negligently believes that justifymg circumstances
exist and, for example, kills in reliance on that belief, to the same liability
as one who did not believe that the situation existed at all, such as a robber
who murders his victim solely to prevent identification by the victim.
Id. at 920.
i,6 See Heberling, supra note 144, at 920.
177 ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 13 1(b)(2), at 74-75. WhileRobinson is actually
discussing self-defense, the same rule would apply to defense of another.
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to defend another, one has the right to assert reasonable force to prevent
unlawful aggression.17 One should note, however, that an individual may
not lawfully defend another against justified aggression. 179 Tis line of
reasoning finds significant support in cases where defendants are charged
with cruninaltrespass in connection with demonstrations at abortion clinics
and those defendants assert they acted in defense of fetuses. Courts have
consistently held that the successful assertion of a third-party defense
requires that defendants respond to unlawful activity To illustrate, the
court held m Allison v. Birmingham8 ° that unless unlawful physical force
is being used by persons in the abortion clinic, a defendant could not
support a defense-of-third-party claim. The court noted that abortions
performed by licensed facilities are not unlawful."2 Every court having the
opportunity to decide the issue has required an unlawful act.8 3
Even those courts that have addressed the issue under a gen-
eral necessity theory have required that a defendant prove the homicide






'Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
181 See id. at 1383.
112 See id. at 1382.
1 See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981);
State v Clarke, 590 A.2d 468 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Aguillard, 567 So.
2d 674 (La. Ct. App. 1990); City of Missoula v. Asbury, 873 P.2d 936 (Mont.
1994); Brumley v. State, 804 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App. 1991, no pet.); Boushey v.
State, 804 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App. 199 1,pet. ref d); Reed v. State, 794 S.W.2d 806
(Tex. App. 1990,pet. refa); Erlandson v State, 763 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App. 1988,
pet. refd); Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App. 1988,pet. refd); Crabb v.
State, 754 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App. 1988, pet. refd); State v Migliorno, 442
N.W.2d 36 (Wis. 1989).
'14 There appear to be two distinct views of the requirement for an unlawful act
m the general necessity context. For the prevailing view, see Debbe A. Levm, Note,
Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48
U. CIN. L.REv 501,502-07,513 (1979). This view posits that the requirement did
not exist at early common law because initially the cases dealt only with harm
emanating from natural forces, which are not subject to criminal law. See id. at
506-07 However, when faced with circumstances involving harm from human
sources, courts modified the law to require that anyone asserting necessity act m
response to illegally threatened harm to another. See id. at 507. But see Patrick G.
Senftle, Comment, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Clinic Trespass Cases, 32
ST. Louis U. L.J. 523 (1987). Senfle rejects the unlawful act requirement and
asserts that the harm an actor seeks to avoid need not flow from illegal human
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age,.' for example, defendants argued that the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity,18 6 particularly since the
defendants believed they had to act to save the unborn.18 7 Relying on
Cleveland v. Municipality ofAnchorage,88 the court held "the defense of
necessity was not available to defendants charged with trespassing at an
abortion clinic when the alleged necessity was the need to prevent
abortions," ' 9 even if the defendants believed they acted reasonably to
prevent imminent threat to human life.19 The court rejected the defendants'
argument on three grounds: First, the defense of necessity applies only
where the harm to be avoided arises from forces of nature or unlawful
human acts. Since abortion is lawful, defendants could not break the law
to prevent abortion. 191 Second, the court found protestors had lawful
alternatives available,1" and, in any event, their actions could not prevent
the threatened harm and would at best postpone the harm for a short
mterval. 9 3 Third, the Cleveland court held there was no showing that the
harm defendants sought to prevent was greater than the reasonably
activity. See id. at 532. He argues that early common law courts recognized that the
necessity defense did not fit any specific formula, particularly since citizens might
justifiably break the law under a number of different circumstances. See id. He
further argues that limiting the use of the defense to illegal human-created harm
unnecessarily constrets the intended scope of the defense. See id. at 528-29, 533-
39. Tis view finds limited support m statutes that employ generic language such
as "harm" or "evil," allowing courts to define the terms as they deem appropriate.
See id. at 529.
85Bird v. Mumcipality of Anchorage, 787 P.2d 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
'
86 See id. at 120.
187 See Id. at 121.
188 Clevelandv. Mumcipality ofAnchorage, 631 P.2d 1073,1078 (Alaska 1981)
(noting that m order to successfully assert the defense of necessity, the defendant
must show that the act was done to prevent a significant evil, that there were no
adequate alternatives, and that the harm done was not disproportionate to the harm
avoided); see also LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 81, § 5.4, at 441,448; PERKINS,
supra note 106, at 1019; Levm, supra note 181, at 513 (discussing the level of
force which may be used by the actor). But see Senftle, supra note 184, at 528-29
(arguing that the Cleveland court relied on the illegal act requirement without legal
authority for doing so).
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foreseeable harm caused by the defendants' own actions. 194 The court
balanced the emotional distress suffered by the clinic's patients due to the
defendants' invasion oftheir right ofpnvacy against the defendants' failure
to intervene to prevent abortions. In accordance with Roe v. Wade,195 the
court concluded that since the Alaska legislature regulated but did not
prohibit abortion, the patients' right of privacy outweighed the harm of
taking a potential life, and the greater harm would be the foreseeable results
of the defendants' actions, not the taking of a potential life.19a
Cases decided before and after Cleveland have consistently held that
the defense of necessity does not extend to those charged with trespass
when seeking to obstruct access to or the operation of abortion climcs.197
The only reported opinion to recognize the necessity defense when applied
to trespass at abortion climcs is People v. Archer 9 Unlike other abortion
facility trespass cases,Archerirvolveda distinction between first-trimester
and late-term abortions. The court recognized that "Roe prohibits the State
statutory necessity defense whenever there are intentional interruptions
which interfere with the performance of first trimester abortions."'199
'9 See id.
"9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196 Bird, 787 P.2d at 121. The court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
and addressed the appellant's argument thatRoe was no longer determinative since
Webster "recognized that abortion is the purposeful killing of life." Id. The court
held:
[E]ven assuming that appellants are correct in arguing that Roe v. Wade
does not control as to the weight to be accorded "potential life" in this
context, the United States Supreme Court is not the only authority to which
we must defer in this area. The Alaska legislature is better suited to strike
the balance than is this court.
Id. at 123 (quoting Clevelandv. Mumcipality ofAnchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1080-
81 (Alaska 1981)). ,
'9' See City of Wichita v. Tilson, 855 P.2d §il, 915-17 (Kan. 1993). For a
detailed discussion of the general necessity defense as it relates to abortion trespass
cases, see James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, "Choice ofEvils, "Necessity, Duress,
or Similar Defense to State or Local Criminal Charges Based on Acts of Public
Protest, 3 A.L.R.5TH 521 (1992 & 1996 Supp.). See also United States v. Turner,
44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defense of necessity does not apply
to abortion trespass cases); Zalv. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
the necessity defense isunavailableto abortion protestors becauselegal alternatives
exist to acheve the goal of persuading women not to have abortions).
"I People v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (City Ct. of Rochester 1988).
19 See zd. at 734.
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However, defendants were entitled to assert the necessity defense so long
as the jury concluded that physicians were about to perform abortions
beyond the first trimester."2 AlthoughArcher is inconsistent withholdings
in other jurisdictions, it is distinguishable most significantly because New
York, in codifying the justification defense, did not adopt the MPC's
narrow definition of "injury to be avoided," which includes an inquiry only
into the legality or illegality of the act a defendant seeks to prevent.2°'
Under the MPC, an actor may assert necessity only when he seeks to
prevent an illegal act. The New York legislature adopted a much broader
test, which permits ajury to make a moral judgment about abortion despite
its legality 202 "[A] jury of private citizens is free to decide that many
of those abortions are immoral 'injuries to be avoided' and that 'the
urgency of avoiding such injuries [to the developing fetus] clearly
outweighs the desirability of avoiding injuries such as Trespassing and
Resisting Arrest "',203 Archer makes clear, however, that the balancing
of injuries and morals can take place only after the first trimester, the point
at which the State has a compelling interest in pregnancy and so may
regulate abortion.204
IV APPLICATION OF DEFENSE-OF-OTHERS THEORY
TO THOSE WHO KILL ABORTION PROVIDERS
Using the circumstances surrounding Paul Hill's killing of John Britton
and his escort as a starting point, this Part addresses the legitimacy of those
who kill abortion providers asserting that homicide is justified in order to
save the fetus based on the defense-of-others justification. This Part
200 See id.
201 See id. at 730-31, MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). Acts that the
legislature had determined were legal could not be evil. This reasoning also
encompassed abortion since the court enumerated which pregnancy terminations
were legal and which were not. SeeArcher, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 730. New York rejects
the MPC's narrow definition of choice of evils. See 1d.
202 See Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 730-31. The New York penal law and the
legislature rejected the MPC language and adopted a broader standard of inquiry.
Under New York law, "conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is
justifiable and not criminal when [the injury to be avoided] is of such
gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality
avoiding such injury clearly outweigh[s] the desirability of avoiding the injury
sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue." Id.2 3 Id. at 732 (paraphrasing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1987)).
204 See id. at 733-34.
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analyzes the defense under both the generally accepted criteria as well as
the MPC and concludes that under either standard the defense is inappro-
priate.
Under the generally accepted criteria, a person who kills an abortion
provider must show that the action was necessary This means that he must
have acted timely and used no greater force than was necessary to defend
another. As for the timeliness requirement, the threat to another must be
imminent or near at hand. In killing Dr. Britton, for example, Paul Hill
might argue that the "killing" of the unborn was close at hand because,
when Dr. Britton arrved at the clinic that day, he was going to perform
abortions. As a result, Hill arguably acted to avert imment peril.
However, this argument does not pass muster under either an MPC or
objective standard. Under an objective approach, one could argue that since
Dr. Britton had just arrived at the clinic and had not begun Ins day's work,
which may or may not have included performing abortions, and since no
patients had presented themselves to the clinic, there was no "immediate"
threat to any fetus.
The MPC, on the other hand, does not require imminence. Rather, the
defensive force must be "immediately necessary,"2 °5 which shifts the focus
of inquiry from the imminence of the threatened harm to the intervenor's
actual need to use force at the time he uses it.2°6 Even under this construc-
tion, the imminence of the harm remains a significant factor in determining
whether force was necessary 207 Relying on the MPC, Paul Hill could argue
his need to use force to prevent future harm to the unborn. If he waited for
Dr. Britton to enter the clinic, it might have been too late to prevent the
harm. An equally strong argument, however, is that Hill's use of deadly
force was premature because Dr. Britton had not yet entered the clinic and
women had not yet arrived for their abortions. By acting before Dr. Britton
had at least prepared to perform the abortion, Hill deprived the doctor of
the ability to change his mind about performing abortions.28
205 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985); see Charles E. Rice & John P
Tuskey, The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly Force to Protect Unborn
Children from Abortionists, 5 REGENT U. L. REV 83, 97 (1995).
206 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 124(f).
' See Rice & Tuskey, supra note 205, at 96-97208 See Id. at 97 n.58. "The value of a less restrictive temporal limitation is that
it allows early intervention, but. the virtue of a more restrictive standard is that
it 'allows time for the apparent threat to abate itself before justifying conduct to
prevent it."' Id. (citing ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 124(f), at 58). See also
ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 13 1(c), at 79 and § 121(a), at 4-5 n.5.
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The other integral component of necessity is proportionality One can
use no more force than is necessary to prevent the threatened harm. Even
if one accepts the argument that Hill meets the timeliness requirement for
using force, it is a difficult argument to accept that he could not have used
any force other than deadly force to prevent the threatened harm. There is
no showing that, on the day of the shooting, Hill made a demand for Britton
to stop performing abortions nor that threats were made in an attempt to
persuade Dr. Britton not to perform abortions. Moreover, there is nothing
indicating that Hill applied a degree of deadly force 09 short of force
resulting m death.210 In fact, while the law recognizes one's right to use
deadly force to defend another, one must use a lesser degree of force if it
can prevent the threatened mjury to another.2" Unless Hill could show that
no lesser force would have averted the threatened harm, he does not meet
the proportionality element of necessity
Under a majority standard, one who acts in defense of another must
subjectively and objectively believe that he must intervene with force. In
applying the subjective standard, the actor's belief that force is necessary
is critical. Part of the inquiry, then, is determining what the actor believed
at the time of the killing. If we again rely on the circumstances surrounding
the killing of Dr. Britton, it is clear that Hill actually believed that the
unborn are persons beginning at conception, that aborting them is morally
wrong and constitutes murder, and that Dr. Britton was about to use
unlawful force against the unborn.2 2 As a result, Hill actually believed that
he had to intervene with deadly force to prevent their murders. If the
inquiry were to end here, under the MPC, Hill could argue that his actual
belief about the necessity to act absolved him of liability for murder, and
at most he was liable for reckless or negligent homicide.2 3
209 In this context deadly force means not just force resulting in death, but any
force that is likely to result in death or serious bodily injury and "also includes
force intended to cause death or grievous bodily injury even if such a result is
unlikely "JOSHUADRESSLERUNDERTANDNG CRIMINALLAW 192 (lsted. 1987).
2
,
0 See Rice & Tuskey, supra note 205, at 104 n.80. In reality, short of a change
in the law, no amount of force, including a forceful demand, from an anti-
abortiomst would stop a health provider from performing abortions.211 See DRESSLER, supra note 64, at 200. It is inportant to note that Hill has no
legitimate argument for the killing of James Barrett, Dr. Britton's escort. Barrett in
no way participated in the performance of abortions, and he was unarmed. The
facts indicate that Hill intended to kill Barrett, since he shot him in the head with
a rifle, reloaded, and shot him again. There is absolutely no defense for this killing.
22 See Paul J. Hill, In Defense ofAnother" The Paul Hill Bref, 5 REGENT U. L.
REv 31, 37-48 (1995).
213 See generally id.
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However, the nquiry must extend further. The court must determine
that, based on the circumstances, the belief was reasonable. Relying on the
above factors, Hill couldnot meetthe reasonableness component. Although
he argued that his actions were morally defensible, they could not be
justified legally 2 4 Crucial to this analysis is that under the current status
of the law, abortion is legal. The law of defense of others requires that the
person against whom force is being exerted be engaged in an unlawful act
against another. Based on Roe, a fetus is not a person within the meaning
of the law,2 15 which prevents one from successfully asserting defense of
others. Even if Hill actually believed that he needed to act, his belief was
unreasonable under the circumstances because he could not meet a basic
objective element of the defense - that the act be unlawful. The law
generally does not permit one to defend against justified aggression.
Abortion is aggression against the fetus, but it is lawful aggression against
which there is no legally recognized defense for the fetus or its self-
appointed defenders.216
214 See id.
215 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973) (holding that a fetus is not
a person under the 14th Amendment).
216 Tns does not mean to suggest that the fetus has not been afforded legal
protection. For example, some states have taken measures to protect the fetus by
crlmmalizmg intentional acts against the fetus. See ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-
1103(A)(5) (West 1989) (establishing that knowingly or recklessly causing the
death of a fetus is manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988 and Supp.
1997) (establishing that one who kills a human being or fetus with malice
aforethought is guilty of murder); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1996) (stating that
one who wilfully kills an unborn quick child by mjury to the mother of the child
is guilty of feticide and pumshable by life impnsonment); 720 ILL. COMP STAT.
ANN. § 519-1.2 (Michite 1993) (stating that one who kills a fetus without privilege
or excuse is guilty of murder, but the death penalty shall not be imposed); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Micle 1994) (imposing a maximum two-year sentence
for taking the life of the fetus); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1993 & Supp.
1997) (establishing criminal liability after the second trimester, making killing a
fetus a Class C felony); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 14:32.5 Ann. (West 1989) (imposing
liability for killing a fetus other than by legal abortions); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
609.266 - .269 (West 1987 and Supp. 1997) (defining killing the fetus as murder
when done with premeditation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to -08 (1985
and Supp. 1995) (establishing five separate categories aimed at protecting the
unborn, including the category of intentionally or knowingly causing the death of
the unborn, which constitutes murder and the category of any negligent act causing
the death of the unborn, wich constitutes negligent homicide); TEX. REV CIv
STAT. ANN. § 4512.5 (Vernon's 1976) (establishing the sentence for one convicted
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Yet Paul Hill's successful assertion of the defense-of-others defense
cannot really turn on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act being
committed by an abortion provider. Ours is a civilized society based on an
orderly system of government that includes a system of punishment. As a
consequence, one must submit to the system m order to preserve the fragile
state of order.217 Still, the law ought to promote the achievement of higher
values at the expense of lesser values, and there are times when the greater
good of society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of
the criminal law 218 If one is unable to submit to the governing law due to
the exigency of the circumstances, however, society must make value
judgments about the character of one's action to be certain that one acts
and, more specifically, kills only when absolutely necessary
of killing the unborn to life or not less than five years); WASH. REV CODE ANN. §
9A.36.021 (1994) (establishing intentional actions against the unborn as second
degree assault); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1995) (imposing a fine of $5000
or imprisonment for not more than three years for killing an unborn child); State
v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990) (noting that the statute does not
require that the living organism m the womb in its embryonic or fetal state be
considered a person or human being, and does not require the state to prove that it
is); Jeffrey A. Parness, Arming the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish
Concoctions?, 53 LA. L. REV 427,428-34 (1992).
And for a general review of recent statutes enacted to protect the fetus, see Julia
Elizabeth Jones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REV 1159,
1164-65 (1992); and see, for example, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7001-1.3 (West
1997) (defining "deprived child" as including children born dependent on a
controlled, dangerous substance); Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The
Cnminalization ofMaternal ConductDunngPregnancy: ADecisionmalangModel
for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357 (1988-89) (using the matter of Pamela Rae
Stewart to urge restraints on the use of criminal penalties against pregnant women);
Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Cnminalization
of "FetalAbuse", 101 HARv L. REV 994 (1988) (reviewing coercive criminal
measures taken against pregnant women); Whitner v State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778
(S.C. 1997) (holding that a viable fetus is a "child" under South Carolina's child
abuse and endangerment statute, and therefore a woman who ingests illegal drugs
during the third trimester of her pregnancy may be prosecuted for criminal child
neglect).
217 See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 68, at 5-6; see also State v. Granda, 565
F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978); Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir.
1957).
218 See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 81, § 5.4(a), at 442; GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 229, at 722 (2d. ed. 1961).
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Defense of others is aumque defense m that, generally, the actor makes
the decision to use justifiable force based on the circumstances as they
appear at the time of his action.219 This presupposes, then, that one usually
acts out of necessity m what appears to be an emergency The defense does
not permit one to plan to kill or injure one's victim, nor does it permit one
to stalk or lie in wait for one's victim knowing or anticipating that the
victim will perform an illegal act against a third party If one kills under
these circumstances, one commits premeditated murder, and one's actions
are neither justified nor excused.2" The following example illustrates this
point:
Suppose A's daughter B is sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant
whom A suspects to be C, a neighbor. A does not tell police about his
suspicions. B's assault is the third in three months. All of the assaults
occurred in various areas of the community jogging path just around
sunset. Believing that the actor would probably strike again, A begins
staking out various areas of the path, gun in hand, hoping to catch the
rapist and stop him, regardless of the circumstances. As expected, within
two weeks of B's assault, A finds C on the jogging path in the process of
sexually assaulting D, another neighbor. A shoots C and claims he acted
to save D.
A cannot justify his actions by relying on the defense-of-others theory
Although C was engaged in an unlawful act against D, A suspected C to be
the rapist and could have called upon law enforcement officials to catch C.
A could argue that he acted in an emergency to save D. However, A did not
act spontaneously based on the circumstances as he perceived them to be
at that moment. Rather, A devised and implemented a plan to stop C,
suspecting that C would likely strike again. Based on this scenario, A
cannot rightfully assert that he acted to defend D.
When applying this scenario to the killing of abortion providers by
those who assert they actedto protect the fetus, the defense collapses. Even
if abortion, like sexual assault, were unlawful and doctors were illegally
aborting fetuses, the law cannot and does not permit one who rejects the
positive law to plan to kill, and ultimately kill, abortion providers. This is
219 See ROBINSON, supra note 143, § 131(a), at 71. Robinson states that self-
defense is unique in that it requires an actor to make a justification when he is in
a difficult position. The same argument can be made of one who acts in defense of
others. See id.
' See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 81, § 7.7, at 642-48.
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not to ignore that citizens sometimes feel helpless because they believe that
society is unwilling or unable to appropriately punish those who break the
law, sowing the seeds of anarchy and violent self-help." But the orderly
progress of society cannot sustam vigilante justice.
Beyond this argument, however, the right to assert defense of others
when defending a fetus cannot depend on the immorality of the act against
which one is defending. Anti-abortiomsts, like Paul Hill, often draw upon
the ills of slavery and the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany to
support their right to defend another with force.m Most would agree that
institutionalized slavery is a source of national and historical shame. Those
who saw the immorality of holding human beings as property labored to
eradicate slavery, acting in violation of a positive law that allowed its
existence. 223 Even in the face of the brutality of slavery, however, one
would not be justified in killing the slave-holder who acted in accordance
with existing laws. In fact, the mandate to end slavery rested in the will of
a collective society who engaged m civil war, in part, to dismantle the
institution of slavery
A parallel argument can be made regarding Hitler's reign ofterror over
Germany Hitler's regime allowed for the killing of thousands of Jews in
2' See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1971); see also Elisabeth
Ayyildez, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The
Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 141, 151-52 (1995)
(arguing that while some theonsts argue that law and legal systems developed as
a desirable alternative to pnvate justice, vigilante justice is appropriate for women
who are abused); Thomas D. Barton, Violence and the Collapse oflmagnation, 81
IOWA L. REv 1249 (1996) (reviewing WENDY KAMiNER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE:
CRIME AND CULTURE (1995)) (noting that some laws have fostered the increase m
violence even though one key function is peacekeeping and constraining violent
self-help); Nadine Klansky, Comment, Bernard Goetz, a "Reasonable Man". A
Look at New York's Justification Defense People v. Goetz, 53 BROOK. L. REV
1149, 1150 (1988) (stating that while people are frustrated with our laws, there
would be a breakdown of civilization ifpeople started taking the law into their own
hands). See generally HENRY M. HART, JR., THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
m See Hill, supra note 212, at 58-80; Rice & Tuskey, supra note 205, at 124-
35.
"2 See BUTLER A. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO SARAH BRADFORD HARRIET
TUBMAN, THE MOSES OFHERPEOPLE VII (1981) (Jones notes that Thomas Garrett,
a Quaker, frequently assisted fugitive slaves even after being twice convicted for
providing aid to runaway slaves. Even after losing all he owned to pay a fine levied
against him for violating the fugitive slave laws, Garrett continued to provide
shelter for slaves in need).
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the name of imperialism.' In the aftermath of World War H, the right and
power of the collective society to punish the moral wrong of those who
permitted and justified the murders as well as those who carried out the
orders pursuant to illegitimate positive laws was widely recogmzed. Anti-
abortionists, like Paul Hill, point to the Nuremberg trials as one means of
legitimzing the argument that those who act immorally and commit crimes
against humanity, even if pursuant to positive law, must be punished.
However, when one deconstructs the argument, it becomes clear that
reliance on the Nuremberg trials to support the anti-abortiomsts' assertion
of the theory of defense of others to justify killing abortion providers is
misplaced. While it is accurate that Hitler's soldiers found no refuge in the
argument that they followed orders pursuant to what masqueraded as
positive law to justify their terrorism of a nation of people, it is also
accurate that the Nuremberg trials convened as a result of an international
directive that did not sanction individual action.m
In fact, before the Nuremberg trials, a London conference ofrepresen-
tatives from nine European countries then occupied by Germany, recogniz-
mg the need to proceed systematically to punish the German government
for its brutalities toward and crimes against humanity,226 drafted the "St.
James Declaration." This declaration stated: "[I]nternational solidarity is
necessary in order to avoid the repression of these acts of violence simply
by acts of vengeance on the part of the general public, and in order to
' Although many Germans acquiesced to Hitler's campaign against the Jews
and other groups, some individuals heroically opposed the laws that authorized the
killings. See generally AT THE HEART OF THE WHITE ROSE (Inge Jens ed., 1987);
HANS SCHOLL & SOPHIE SCHOLL, AT THE HEART OF THE WHITE ROSE (1987) (The
White Rose was a group of young Germans who worked to expose the brutality and
lawlessness of the Nazi regime by distributing leaflets to sympathizing Germans.
The group's leaders, Hans and Sople Scholl, were arrested and charged with
preparing for treason. They were convicted of their crimes and sentenced to death.
See id. at 280.); MARIE VASSILTCHIKOV, BERLIN DIARIES, 1940-1945, 192-220
(1985) (noting that Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg plotted with others to
remove Hitler from power. Stauffenberg took a briefcase contaimng a bomb into
Hitler's heavily guarded headquarters. After the bomb destroyed the building, von
Stauffenberg informed his conspirators that Hitler was dead. He was tried and
executed for hIs participation in the conspiracy. See id., see also Hill, supra note
212, at 70-73).
m See Hill, supra note 212, at 61-73.
2 See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG TRIALS: WAR CRIMES AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 244-45 (1949).
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satisfy the sense of justice of the civilized world ,27 The European
countries
place[d] among their principal war alms the punishment, through the
channel of organised justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these
crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated
m them, [and] resolve to see to it m a spirit of international solidarity, that
(a) those guilty or responsible, whatever their nationality, are sought out,
handed over to justice and judged, (b) that the sentences pronounced are
carried outY8
It is clear that the Declaration's primary objectives were to call for
action only through organized justice and punish only those who had been
"handed over tojustice" and found guilty " The European nations' express
policies do not sustain arguments favoring vigilante justice.
Historical records clearly evidence the systematic procedures taken to
vindicate those who suffered injustice at the hands ofthe Nazi regime. Paul
Hill insists that, knowing what we know now, those who tried to hide Jews
or kill Hitler and his soldiers would not be prosecuted and probably would
be rewarded. 0 Even if one were to allow this argument as it pertains to
, Id. The London conference was the first step toward the formulation of a
systematic program for handling war criminals. Not long after the St. James
Declaration, the United States joined with other Allied nations in establishing a
United Nations War Crimes Commission. This action was deemed the second step
in establishing an international war crimes program. See id. at 246. The final step
emerged from the Moscow Conference, which produced the 'Declaration on
German Atrocities in Occupied Europe." It announced that the "German officers
and men and members of the Nazi party" who had in some way been responsible
for the atrocities and killings would be sent back to the countries where the deeds
were done and the brutalities occurred and punished according to the laws of that
country. See id at 246-47 Crucial to the declaration, however, is that "major [war]
criminals whose offences [had] no particular geographical location [would be]
punished by ajoint decision of the Governments of the Allies." Id. at 247 This last
statement provided the authority for holding the Nuremberg and other international
trials.
I Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
29 Id., see THE NORNBERG CASE v-xii, 7-18 (as presented by Robert H.
Jackson, Cief of Counsel for the United States, 1947). In his letter to President
Truman, Justice Jackson set forth an orderly and systematic plan to prosecute war
criminals.
11 See Hill, supra note 212, at 70-7 1.
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insurgents in Nazi Germany, it would not lessen the illegality of Hill and
others who planned the methodical killing of abortion providers. The
injustices of Nazi Germany were addressed by an internationally recog-
mzed war tribunal. Vigilante justice aimed at the war criminals would have
been neither tolerated nor justified. Similarly, Hill's "vigilante justice"
should not either.
CONCLUSION
The anti-abortion movement's concern for preserving the life of the
fetus is legitimate and cannot be ignored, nor should those concerned with
ending abortion be silenced. Anti-abortionists have a constitutional right to
seek change in abortion laws through protest, civil disobedience, or other
means. The road to change encompasses a number of acceptable measures
that can be taken to fight abortion. However, they do not include the use of
violence resulting in the killing of physicians and other health care
providers.
Killing abortion providers is antithetical to the very message anti-
abortionists seek to convey- that life is valuable and it must be preserved.
Yet there are those like Paul Hill who believe that it is a moral imperative
to end abortion by any means necessary, including killing abortion
providers to save the fetus. They believe they are justified under a theory
of defense of others. Ironically, anti-abortionists who believe in using
deadly force to end abortion have lost sight of the very value of life. In
fighting to save one life, they willfully take another. However, the history
of our laws is based on a notion of reasonableness, and it is unreasonable
and both morally and legally indefensible to fail to recognize the value of
a life, even the life of one who performs or assists in abortions. Relying on
historical ills such as slavery and the death camps of Germany to justify the
killings does not pass muster, particularly since the decision to avenge such
injustices was based on a national or international directive. Anti-abortion-
ists have the right to push for social change and seek the support of the
collective. They have the right to be advocates for the rights of fetuses and
to prevent their abortion. The question remains, however: shall we protect
the unborn with murder? The moral and legal answer is "no."

